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Abstract 
 
Politics is central to development discourse yet remains peripheral.  And, over 
some twenty years, a civil society narrative has not fulfilled its potential to 
‘bring politics back in’.  Reasons can be found in conceptual confusion, in 
selectivity in donor thinking and policies towards civil society and in the 
growth-driven political economy of NGO-ism.  Remedies for the political 
lacunae are being sought through a focus on rights, citizenship and leadership 
that show valuable, focused progress. This article examines a comprehensive 
complement to such efforts referred to as civic driven change (CDC).  
Originating in a grounded empirical approach, the constituent principles and 
elements of CDC offer a lens that can both sharpen and deepen insights and 
advance analysis of socio-political processes.  As a work in progress, a CDC 
narrative is illustrated by reference to contemporary examples of citizen action 
that play out at multiple sites of governance.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The insertion of ‘civil society’ into development debate has not lived up to expectations.  
The concepts’ theoretical provenance offered an opportunity to respond to an oft repeated 
call to ‘bring politics back in’ to an essential position within aided development thinking 
and practice (e.g., Berntzen and Selle; 1990; Nederveen-Pieterse, 2002; Hickey, 2009).1  
Some twenty years of experience shows that selective variations of the concept have been 
deployed by western governments in support of a utilitarian interpretation and agenda 
propagating western universalism.  The international aid system has been one important 
mechanism for doing so.  Since the early nine-teen nineties, for official development 
agencies, a shift of policy perspectives from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) in a 
‘third sector’ to civil society as a political category offered an opportunity to re-think 
development in terms of the evolution of power relations between a state and the polity.  
It also offered a messy empirical category that could politically inform the conditionality 
of aid funding.  Yet, over this period, civil society discourse has not managed to “… 
establish politics as a central concern within development studies …” (Hickey, 
                                                 
1  Following Bebbington et al, 2008, a distinction is made between big ‘D’ development of societies as a 
whole over time and the little ‘d’ development associated with international aid and cooperation. 
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2009:141).  Nevertheless, a recent review of development research confirms that this goal 
is as necessary as it ever was: 
 
“Development is Politics. The key message from all four research programmes 
has been the centrality of politics in building effective states and shaping 
development outcomes. It shows ‘politics’ not as an abstract concept, but as an 
essential determinant of the Millennium Development Goals – that is, better 
educated, healthier, more prosperous people. The research has delivered this 
message in many ways. It provides evidence of politics as the ‘driver of 
change’ and as the ultimate cause of people’s security and access to justice. It 
shows how local the local political economy influences taxation, fragility and 
the ability of citizens to participate in their own development.” (DFID, 2010:4, 
emphasis in the original) 
 
A similar conclusion can be found in a recent, comprehensive review of Dutch aid policy 
and performance. 
“After all, aid is never innocent: it places countries in a dependent position and 
gives rise to all sorts of power politics in which individuals try to benefit 
themselves and their own people.” (van Lieshout, Wendt and Kremer, 2010:266) 
 
The fact that official aid for development and the dominant development narrative itself 
is a political instrument in a repertoire of international relations is hardly contested.  
Riddell (2007:398) contends that until aid is de-coupled from the systemic problems 
stemming from the bi-lateral interests of donor countries the quest for greater 
effectiveness will remain undermined.  Yet, this reality is masked by assertions of 
poverty as the guiding criteria for aid with the Millennium Development Goals acting as 
the public justification for the deeper real-politic of aid allocations and its volatility an 
unreliability (Cogneau and Naudet, 2007; Bulir and Hamman, 2008).  Whichever way 
one approaches aided development, politics matters a lot. 
 
This article describes an ongoing effort to bring politics and socio-political processes into 
the core of development discourse.2  It details the substance of civic driven change 
(CDC) as a novel narrative recognising, but conceptually relocating civil society.  The 
following section offers a brief re-cap of how civil society has been variously understood 
and the problems that such a situation has created.  This background is followed by a 
review of how the concept has been selectively applied in and by the official aid system 
to generally produce apolitical outcomes.  It is argued that mutually supportive forces are 
involved which operate as an interlocked system in international aid.  A result, described 
in section three, is a search for a way out of the current civil society impasse which 
responds to the more complex layers of political arrangements associated with 
globalization, advances in communications technology and the nature of the uncertainties 
faced by all societies.  A concluding section describes what needs to be done to better 
comprehend and demonstrate CDC as an additional lens in the analytic repertoire of 
                                                 
2  Here we borrow from Hickey (2009:142) in following his adoption of Mouffe’s distinction between 
politics as the practices, discourses and rules of the game required for social order, while the political stems 
from the issues and struggles between social groups for power and resources. 
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development studies.  This introductory broad treatment sets out the scope of what CDC 
is and has, potentially, to offer.  As a work in progress, a finer grained analysis is part of 
future research plans and an anticipated series of publications. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AS A DISCOURSE 
Triggered by the implosion of authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Asia and Central 
Europe in the 1990s,  the re-emergence of the notion of civil society into political theory 
and its contested meanings and interpretations are well documented and critiqued (e.g., 
Cohen and Erato, 1992; Hann and Dunn, 1996; Deakin, 2001; Hodgkinson and Foley, 
2003; Chambers and Kymlicke, 2003; Edwards, 2004).  In addition, narrow geo-
historical origins of some two hundred years in western Europe and North America 
spurred debates on the concept’s broader international validity (e.g., Blaney and Pasha, 
1993; Kumar, 1993; Mamdani, 1996; Lewis, 2003) which have not produced a 
convincing outcome.  In this sense, depending on your point of view, the search for a 
resolution of a civil society narrative has reached a dead end or remains an ongoing 
challenge.  In either case, empirical study and resolution of contending positions is 
exacerbated by the difficulties of applying the concept to countries such as China and 
Vietnam which are adopting market economic principles while maintaining socio-
political configurations deeply rooted in communism (Howell, 1993; Howell and 
Pearce2001). 
 
It can be argued that civil society has been so variously understood as to be almost 
meaningless in terms of providing a coherent conceptual and empirical political-analytic 
framework.  For example, the concept is used in a singular fashion, arguing that there is a 
‘civil society position’ or a ‘civil society interest’, thereby ignoring those that disagree 
with this.  A condition of multiple meanings is perpetuated because the alternative 
conceptualisations on offer are self-referential in terms of how civil society is defined and 
located in analysis of political processes and power relationships (Van Rooy, 1998).  This 
makes robust comparison and empirical validation somewhat illusory.  Glasius (2010: 1-
2) illustrates alternative ways in which the civil society is understood, sometimes in  
“a number of quite different and sometimes contradictory normative 
connotations, stemming from different parts of its long intellectual history”.  
 
Glasius provides five examples:  
 
Civil society as social capital: through frequent association with each other in a 
variety of networks, trust between citizens is built up through a virtuous cycle of 
repeatedly meeting each other’s expectations. This solves collective action 
problems and improves the well-being of the community and its citizens - a 
notion inspired by de Tocqueville and Putnam.  
 
Civil society as citizens active in public affairs: rather than just being producers 
and consumers, civil society denotes people’s willingness to give time and 
attention to engagement in public affairs for the common good.  
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Civil society as non-violent and resisting violence: it constitutes the recognition 
that resolving conflict through non-violent means is preferable to the use of 
force, and engages in non-violent and anti-violent collective action. Inspired by 
Gandhi and peace movements.  
 
Civil society as fostering public debate: this sees civil society as synonymous 
with the public sphere. In this sphere, through the media and venues of public 
debate such as town hall meetings, citizens debate each other with proposals for 
the public good, and through these deliberations better policy proposals are 
formulated, which informs formal politics. Inspired by Habermas.  
 
Civil society as counter-hegemony: while civil society is in part a hegemonic 
project of designing and disseminating ideologies that justify individual and 
collective differences in power and wealth, this sphere also gives space to doing 
the opposite: formulating and disseminating ideologies that challenge the 
powerful and champion the marginalised, through cultural institutions such as 
the media, churches, associations or trade unions. Initially one creates one’s own 
counter-hegemonic institutions, but eventually the project is to ‘overwhelm’ the 
mainstream. Inspired by Gramsci.”  (Emphasis in original) 
 
Glasius goes on to argue that a mix and match of these attributes and perspectives leads 
to different versions of civil society that satisfy neoliberal, liberal, radical and post-
modern predispositions.  This rendition corresponds to a debate which seems to be unable 
to advance a compelling theoretical proposition about the role of civil society in the 
trajectories and outcomes of ongoing political evolution within, between and above 
nation states.  Assistance from other disciplines, such as international relations, does not 
seem to offer much hope for reconciliation or coherence.  For example, when comparing 
three ‘big visions’ of the future world (dis)order Richard Betts (2010) argues that there is 
no unequivocal sign of a global convergence towards western configurations of state-
society relations and related internal distribution of power.  Modernization does not 
necessarily equal westernisation and economics does not necessarily triumph over 
(cultural) identity and dignity.  Consequently, it is unwise to assume that an uncontested 
version of civil society will arise from processes of globalization any time soon. 
 
Another problem is that the slant of these normative positions is one of civil society as 
naturally ‘good’ in the sense of seeking justice, fairness and some understanding of a 
collective good and collaborative problem solving that are all conducive to 
(re)establishing social order.  The so called ‘non-civic’ part of civil society that also 
drives and act as protagonists in socio-political processes – oligarchic elites, terrorisms, 
corporate and drug cartels, human traffickers, sects or groups pre-disposed to violence, 
xenophobia and so on – seem to be ignored.  Yet their existence and influence on issues 
such as limitations on civil liberties (Sidel, 2004), regime corruption and the politics of 
immigration are patently clear.  Such forces in a ‘warts and all’ civil society and in 
development itself need to be better theoretically recognised and accounted for (Monga, 
2008). 
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The conceptual and normative ambiguities of civil society described above are 
compounded by the empirical messiness of the socio-political motives, relationships, 
structures, forms, functions and expressions of a polity as it exerts agency.  Experience of 
multi-country research projects on civil society – such as the Johns Hopkins quantitative 
comparative study and the qualitative Civicus Civil Society index – show a struggle to 
both delineate and investigate configurations and socio-political conditions, processes 
and agents that are ‘invisible’ to outsiders but very much visible to those involved 
(Biekart, 2008).  This empirical difficulty is being exacerbated by the spontaneity and 
transience of collective action politics made increasingly possible by advances in 
communications technology where ‘everybody’ can be at the table (Shirky, 2008).   
 
In sum, as currently pursued, civil society discourse is unresolvably too ‘plural’ and its 
context-specific expressions too diverse to offer a prospect of a making an unambiguous 
contribution to political theory and action.  In a world that is becoming more 
interdependent with states less able to solve more (super) wicked problems and dilemmas 
alone (e.g., Rischard, 2002; Levin, Bernstein, Cashmore and Auld, 2009)3, a civil society 
story will remain a useful but limited vantage point to adequately comprehend and 
explain the socio-political processes involved at their inter-connected scales.  A more 
directly political approach is called for. 
 
For reasons set out next, a similar argument can be made for the low probability that the 
concept and realities of civil society will bring politics into the centre of development 
studies. 
 
THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Prior to the era of civil society discourse, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had 
been the principle non-market driven, non-state actor gaining prominence in development 
theory, policy and practice premised on their assumed comparative advantages (e.g., 
Brown and Korten, 1989).  , The subsequent global growth in numbers, scale and 
diversity since then makes general statements about NGOs problematic – there will 
always be specific exceptions in time and place that need to be recognised.  With this 
caveat in mind, the advent of civil society into development analysis some twenty years 
ago involved twin processes of adjustment within the aid community.  First, it was 
necessary to determine how exactly this concept would alter existing thinking about how 
change happens by whom.  Second, was a challenge to incorporate NGO-ism4 into this 
evolving and, for donors, new way of modelling development while, at the same time, 
operationalizing ‘good governance’ objectives and mainstreaming the New Policy 
Agenda. 
 
                                                 
3  Super wicked problems are wicked problems with additional characteristics which include: (a) Time is 
running out; (b) No central authority; (c) those seeking to solve the problem are also causing it; and (d) the 
value of solutions is discounted in non-liner ways.  
4  Following Hilhorst, (2003) NGO-ism is understood as a set of expectations, assumptions, vocabulary and 
performance metrics of public benefit meriting tax concessions that are associated with western non-profit 
organisations self-mandated to undertake development work. 
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Much intellectual effort was applied to the former challenge.  Contending ideas about 
what civil society was and did in ‘big D’ development were identified in terms of their 
‘small d’ equivalents (fn.1., Van Rooy, 1998; Pratt, 2003).  Others analysts took a more 
critical stance, pointing out the contradictions between the conceptual options on offer.  
With their increasing dependency on official aid, observers also questioned the 
willingness of NGOs to make hard choices between options under dominant conditions of 
neo-liberalism (Eade, 2000; Howell and Pearce, 2001).  Expectations about NGO roles in 
support of material improvement and democratization in post-Soviet countries tried to 
combine these twin processes of adjustment to new conditions (Clayton, 1994, 1996).  A 
moment and potential arose for civil society thinking to bring a more directly political 
dimension not just to national development but to NGOs themselves (Clark, 1991, 1993) 
and, subsequently, transnationally (Clark, 2003; Taylor, 2004; Batliwala and Brown, 
2006).  Some observers wondered if such an unanticipated shift in discourse with its 
multiple interpretations could re-invigorate an anticipation, from the nineteen seventies, 
that NGOs would offer an alternative, more politically ‘activist’ and progressive model of 
development thinking and practice (Fowler, 2006).  In other words, could and would 
NGOs exploit the moment and re-grasp an opportunity to counter the social-welfare and 
participatory ‘voice’ bias of the official system towards NGO policy (Bebbington, Hickey 
and Mitlin, 2008:11-15)?  For reasons set out below, this did not happen to any 
substantive degree.  Growing expectations about the political potential of social 
movements, rather than NGOs, is but one indication of this outcome (Ghimire, 2005). 
 
At a similar moment, the official aid system made – unsurprisingly - a relatively narrow 
selection between contenting theories of civil society in favour of those most consistent 
with liberal market democracy premised on negotiated processes of change in society 
(Riddell, 2007).  This choice is illustrated, for example, in the remedial roles allocated to 
CSOs as part of structural adjustment policies (Lipton, 1991).  Subsequently, the 
introduction of poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) required NGOs to take on 
‘participatory’ functions that called for a more ‘enabling environment’ (World Bank, 
2003).  Sensitive to the ‘sovereignty constraint’ in international relations, alternative 
theories of civil society that embody political disputation and struggles for power were 
marginalised.   
 
Within this overall ideological template, donor policies towards civic society as 
organisations (CSOs) showed modest variation in the mix of concepts employed (Giffen 
and Judge, 2010).  Depending on the donor country concerned, normative plurality 
allowed for greater or lesser accommodation of ‘progressive’ NGOs.  Over time, donor 
policy space opened up for inclusion of other types of entities.  Faith-based groups, trade 
unions, and professional associations were recognised as member-based constituents of 
organised civil society with a developmental contribution to make.  Be that as it may, the 
‘intermediation’ function of NGOs in and between societies remained the dominant 
character of what, in many aided countries, became understood as civil society.  
Correspondingly, in equating NGOs with CSOs, regimes computed the latter as being of 
value when supplementing state social development efforts but with suspicion of non-
service ‘political’ functions, such as advocacy.  A ‘backlash’ against NGOs at the United 
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Nations signalled the discomfort of many (autocratic) regimes with CSOs gaining a 
bigger presence and influence in (inter)national bodies (Mohammed, 1997). 
 
More directly, NGO-ism served as a financing source to the relief complements of armed 
resistance movements, such as the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Association.  They 
also acted as a ‘holding ground’ for political aspirants within the then prevailing single 
party political systems.  It was tacitly understood that NGO-ism would and could be 
‘political’ in serving a donor’s foreign policy imperatives, but could not be overtly 
recognised as such (Biekart, 2005).  Thus, by and large, NGOs did not provoke an open 
debate on the politics of development and were criticised for simply aiding and abetting 
western interests.  For example, protagonists across the NGO fault lines in the Fifty Years 
is Enough campaign against the World Bank speak to the different political positions in 
play.  The mainstream NGO adoption of critical engagement towards such (inter-
)governmental institutions may incrementally shift ideas and practices of official 
development institutions, but do not upset the prevailing neo-liberal perspective on civil 
society (e.g., World Vision, 1996).  Looking back, the resulting conditions attached to 
public financing of NGOs for development activities - and the latter’s responses to such 
conditions - point to a significant, but not exclusively, political-economy imperative for 
self-sustainability that has mitigated against them bringing politics back in. 
 
Official conditionality towards aided CSOs has played out in many ways that lead to 
apolitical outcomes.  First, it has discounted the significant diversity of inspirations, 
contending political forces and interfaces within civil society in favour of the service 
delivery and public accountability functions common to domestic non-profit 
organisations.  As a consequence, an NGO choosing an alternative concept of civil 
society and other roles tends to self-exclude from direct support from official aid 
agencies.  But, it also means that it is better able to mitigate against overly growth-driven 
organisational strategies which – in the name of the poor – would make them supplicants 
to donors that typically demand compliance with officially ‘approved’ technocratic 
development practices (Wallace, Crowther and Shephard, 1988; Wallace, Bornstein and 
Chapman, 2006).  However, the proportion of official aid NGOs rely on has increased 
significantly over time.5  This suggests many NGOs have not chosen against seeking 
public finance for their work.  This process leads to self-restraint in adopting 
development theory or practice centred on politics.  That is not to say, that NGOs are not 
politically aware or informed.  But dependency on public finance, allied to risk aversion, 
predisposes to apolitical development practices – service delivery wins out over overt 
civic activism. 
 
Second, a predominantly service and market perspective on what civil society has to 
contribute to ‘small d’ development has been reinforced by applying the concept and 
language of a ‘sector’ with roots in the economics of comparative advantage.  This ‘third 
sector’ is often portrayed as a harmonious sphere in which all the anomalies of the market 
and the state are compensated, while conflicts between interests and anti-social behaviour 
                                                 
5  Reliable figures on sources of NGO financing for development over time are not available.  OECD/DAC 
statistics signal twenty years of substantial increases to NGOs as a ‘sector’.  When humanitarian aid is 
included 
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are ignored.  The sector influence on identity is reinforced by the proposition that, as a 
sector, civil society can be ‘enumerated’ and its economic value computed (e.g., 
Salamon, 2010).  Such a proposition and its effects on public policy negate and mask a 
civil society’s fluid, spontaneous and politically dynamic expressions seen recently in 
North Africa and the Middle East.  Negotiation within this frame impacts on NGO self-
understanding towards an economic rather than political perspective (Johansson, et al, 
2010).   
 
As a consequence, treating oneself as part of a’ sector’ relies on (accountability) logics of 
efficiency and effectiveness of outputs.  These metrics can also foster identity ambiguity 
for NGOs whose theory of change is disposed towards a more progressive position on 
civil society and hence on themselves (Shutt, 2009).  The portrayal of civil society as one 
constituent in a tri-sector society model serves to either de-politicise or to tightly frame 
discourse towards existing dominant definitions of reality.   
 
Fourth, as aided civil society, NGOs have often adopted an official development agenda 
focussed on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as paralleling efforts at 
donor harmonization - the Paris Agenda on aid effectiveness (Booth, 2008).  The absence 
of politics associated with these frameworks is readily observed.  So framed, advocacy 
and lobbying are, for example, directed at reforming governance through public policy 
and respect for human rights.  In parallel, organisational competencies required to 
demonstrate a tangible contribution to MDGs associate NGO professionalism with 
(business) managerialism and its metrics.  This expectation reinforces a common 
internal/governance pressure for year on year financial growth.  This stance is inherent to 
non-profits as an organisational type (Kanter and Summers, 1987).  An NGO growth 
orientation also has origins in Caritas where monetary turnover is a proxy measure of 
success, which combines with a business logic and measures in a prerogative to sustain 
the organisation.6  Together, these factors bind NGOs to a ‘follow the money’ political 
economy (e.g., Albertyn and Tjønneland, 2010).  This imperative is seen in INGO 
organisational adaptations to match changes in resource distribution mechanisms, such as 
donor decentralization in funding decision making (Ronalds, 2010).  Moreover, the 
introduction of market-inspired competitive bidding accentuates a commodification of an 
NGO development approach.  Such allocation practices work against treating sustainable 
development as a co-produced socio-political processes between people who are (not) 
poor and those working in solidarity with them.  This negation of people’s agency plays 
through the intermediation mechanism from North to South. 
 
As role models, in aid recipient countries western NGOs invoke an exogenous 
understanding and frame of reference for what civil society means and does.  A common 
result is the emergence of a strata of local NGOs playing an intermediation role that are 
semi-detached from their own society in terms of norms, cultural; embedding and 
financing.  The processes involved correspond more to social entrepreneurship than the 
spirit of voluntarism that NGO-ism used to portray.  In itself, if honestly recognised, this 
outcome is not necessarily harmful, albeit difficult to sustain outside of foreign financing.  
                                                 
6  The technical difficulties of measuring development performance help perpetuate growth as a proxy for 
success and indicator of organisational health. 
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But transmission by northern NGOs of the economic imperative to be self-sustained, 
works against taking a politically-centred stance to change society.  Calculated risk 
aversion is also involved, from which NGOs are seldom sites of mobilization of a 
followership with a political agenda.  While they may help create supportive conditions 
and necessary capabilities, this type of action civic action is more likely to arise within 
endogenous forces of civil society. 
 
The forgoing does not imply that  aided civil society has failed in its quest to save lives, 
help people escape poverty, protect the vulnerable, increase resources for non-state 
actors, introduce valuable innovations, influenced critical national and international 
policies, provided political refuge and form important international networks across civic 
actors.  The point is that these achievements have not substantively advanced the political 
character and foundation for realising development outcomes.  We are not arguing that 
civil society discourse as currently applied has lost its value or should be replaced.  
Rather we contend that the way civil society is understood and deployed within the 
context of aid is too limited and de-politicised to illuminate contemporary socio-political 
processes of change within, between and above nation states.  
 
This state of affairs in aided development debate has not gone unnoticed.  For example, a 
common NGO critique from the political left informs initiatives such as the World Social 
Forum (WSF) (e.g., Sen, et al, 2007; Bond, 2010).  Heated debates at WSF about a new 
economic model and new politics to remedy the failures of the liberal macro-economic 
and party systems are not common, however, in other international NGO forums.  While 
acting as a counter-point to dominant narratives, WSF’s effects on centring politics in 
development discourse remain limited, in part because the whole notion of ‘development’ 
is essentially contested. 
 
Another response is seen in initiatives that seek a more foundational political discourse 
by invoking human rights and citizenship (Gaventa, 2006).7  These advances tend to 
work with a political narrative of power associated with identity, participation and 
engagement between claimants and duty bearers.  Such a point of entry has brought gains 
on many fronts, for example, in terms of insights about the nature of citizenship as a 
process of becoming rather than as a conferred legal status (Gaventa, 2006).  In addition, 
common assumptions about the relationships between people’s voices and the 
effectiveness of articulation through different types of civic formation have been tested 
and challenged (Gaventa and Barrett, 2010).  However, in doing so, concentration on the 
poor or excluded in relation to the state, has often been at the cost of: (1) the significance 
of citizen-to-citizen interaction within civil society that does not, a priori, lead to state 
‘fragility’; (2) adequate attention to the uncivil dimensions of political agency; and (3) 
applying citizenship across all facets and institutions of a society as political project.  
Consequently, while drawing on this work, a further step was needed to establish a 
politically-centred narrative of development – both with a big D and small d – which was 
not hampered by the selectivity of, as well as impasse in, existing civil society discourse.  
An initiative in this direction started some three years ago and is the subject of 
subsequent sections. 
                                                 
7 E.g., <www.ids.ac/drc> 
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Thirdly, though not adopting a civil society perspective - sponsored by bilateral donors, 
NGOs and a foundation - a recent initiative in a similar direction is the Development 
Leadership Programme (DLP) which: 
“…  addresses an important gap in international thinking and policy about the 
critical role played by leaders, elites and coalitions in the politics of 
development.  This growing program brings together business, academic and 
civil society partners from around the world to explore the role of human agency 
in the processes of development. DLP will address the policy, strategic and 
operational implications of ‘thinking and working politically’ - for example, 
about how to help key players solve collective action problems, forge 
developmental coalitions, negotiate effective institutions and build stable states.” 
(DLP, 2011.i) 
 
As will be seen, there are a number of findings from a review of case studies initiated by 
DLP that reinforce those which underpin civic drive change. 
 
CIVIC DRIVEN CHANGE:  ESTABLISHING A NARRATIVE 
What has emerged as a narrative of Civic Driven Change is the product of multiple 
discussions with some of the key Dutch development NGOs.8  The debate was driven by 
frustration at the lack of a self-determined and robust story with which to proactively 
shape how the Netherlands’ government was shifting its policy and practice of funding 
towards these private aid agencies.  Over several political cycles, Dutch NGOs - working 
for 75 per cent or more with government subsidies - had questioned state-crafted 
understandings and positions on what was proposed as its NGO funding priorities, 
criteria and measures.  The Ministry’s perspective increasingly reflected a utilitarian 
ascription of the role of civil society organisations with Dutch features of social welfare 
and ‘pillarization’.9  Investing in the search for a NGO/CSO narrative that would stand in 
its own right with its own ontology would be a valuable but uncertain effort worth taking.  
Following a grounded empirical methodology, a multi-disciplinary international team 
contributed to the emergence of a narrative centrally informed by civic agency (Fowler 
and Biekart, 2008).  The following sections  concentrate on CDC’s substance with 
selected illustrations and discussion of its theoretical location.  It is a work in progress 
continuing to absorb feedback and critique.10 
 
The substance 
As the theoretical debate elaborated in the next section will demonstrate, civic driven 
change is a composite of pre-existing ideas and theories that are connected in a novel 
way.  CDC can be described in terms of major propositions which translate into core 
elements.   
                                                 
8 These Dutch NGOs included Hivos, Cordaid, Oxfam-Novib, ICCO, SNV, Pax Christi, and Context. 
9   The term on Dutch is ‘verzuiling’ and alludes to the physical pillars used to support cities and used as a 
metaphor for a social structuration based on religious differences and a culture of tolerance for diversity.  
10  We are grateful to a series of critical inputs to this work from:  Harry Boyte, Lucia Boxelaer, Mike 
Edwards, Georgina Gomez, Bert Helmsing, Remko Berkhout, Marlieke Kieboom, Peter Knorringa, 
Monique Kremer, Jenny Pearce, Josine Stremmelaar,  
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In order to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding and misappropriation of meaning at 
this stage of exploration, to describe CDC, we try to avoid using vocabulary commonly 
deployed in aided-development discourse.  For example, in CDC terms, a participant is a 
citizen; participation is understood as civic agency; partnership is understood as a type of 
collaboration; and a project is treated as a case of civic agency, beneficiaries are 
constituencies.  Bearing language in mind, the substance of CDC can be summarised in 
four basic propositions and eight elements.  These constituent parts form a composite lens 
that can be applied to illuminate and understand human agency in processes of socio-
political change. 
 
CDC propositions and constituent elements 
The individual and comparative case analysis underpinning CDC pointed towards four 
critical perspectives on how society can be conceived and its trajectories understood.  It 
does so within a political framework provided by a nation state and its foundation on the 
concepts of citizenship and rights – both of which can be problematized.   
 
For CDC, the first proposition is that societies are regarded as ‘political projects’ where 
all walks of life contain various types of power, political forces and players.  All people 
act politically in what they do or don’t do with their lives.  This requirement for political 
centring in development thinking is stressed by Hickey (2009:142).  Second, civic agency 
is the principle, normative unit of concern where history, context and power to define the 
situation matter (Goldfarb, 2006).  Being ‘civic’ is understood to mean pro-social 
behaviours that respect difference between people and shows concern for the whole of 
society and not just for self (Fowler, 2009).11  Historically, countering uncivil behaviour 
– intolerance, discrimination, exploitation – are part and parcel of social structuration and 
a polity’s struggle with itself.12  That socio-political change in society is driven by both 
civic and uncivil agency needs to be seen and explained (Monga, 2008).  A third 
proposition advances an appreciative position (Cooperrider, 1989) on social realities and 
on solving (wicked) problems which are understood as the unfulfilled imagination of a 
preferred situation.  Living together inevitably generates dilemmas of collective action.  
Solutions call for imagination which co-defines a desired future situation which attracts 
the initiative, energy and agency of many – for example towards a sustainable ecology or 
a world without hunger (Ostrom, 2005).  Fourthly, development is an inherently 
uncertain, complex, indeterminate process involving societal co-production for good or ill 
(e.g., Jervis, 1997; Beinhocker, 2006).  The drivers involved demonstrate conflict and 
contention as well as collaboration and sharing (Seabright, 2004).   
 
These propositions translate into a set of elements that are connected in different ways by 
existing bodies of theory and practice discussed in subsequent sections.  The constituent 
elements of civic driven change have the following eight characteristics.  In a sense they 
compositely ‘define’ what can be understood as civic driven change in their combination 
rather than in their singularities.   
                                                 
11  In Confucian philosophy, these two conditions are prerequisites for social order. 
12 The paradox of uncivil behaviour like street protests and insurrection for greater civil ends remains and 
can only be judged case by case in terms of outcomes. 
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(i) CDC relies on a rights-based understanding of political agency tied to citizenship that 
is simultaneously an individual and a collective identity.  It is a defining relationship 
between a state and the polity.  Legitimacy of the former calls for active, informed 
involvement by the latter.  Where citizenship is not in play and the right to have rights is 
not honoured by a state - and there are a number of such situations - this latter condition 
needs first to be fulfilled.  The ideological stance of North Korea towards its citizens, 
intolerance of public dissent in Turkmenistan , rule by autocratic regimes in the Middle 
East create conditions where active citizenship, be it allowed on paper, is denied in 
practice. 
 
(ii) CDC is not sector-bound.  A CDC lens focuses on civic action for good or ill 
throughout all realms and institutions of society rather than a pre-occupation with civil 
society that has been uncritically conceived as only working for public benefit.  Put 
another way, CDC is not located in institutionally specific ways – it does not ‘belong’ to 
civil society.  The recent revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and similar civic action 
elsewhere did not emerge from a ‘sector’ but from people in all walks of life that had 
experienced unemployment, giving bribes to stay in business, been compromised by 
security services to spy on their neighbours and family, experienced denial as political 
opposition and so on (Al Aswany, 2004).  These micro politics combine to frustration 
that breeds radicalism and mass public dissent with an unlikely trigger of self-
immolation.  Such drivers of civic energy are not confined to the poor, marginalised or 
civil society as such but to the polity at large. 
 
(iii) CDC is open and scalable.  Civic agency can be observed at any (aggregate) level of 
socio-political arrangements as well as horizontally through, for example, self-organised 
network relationships.  It incorporates links from local to global change and back again as 
an iterative process.  The political effects of combining civic agency through social media 
– again Egypt is an illustration, as was the Battle for Seattle at the World Trade 
Organisation Ministers meeting in 1999.  While most visible when involving violence 
which draws media attention, such events show how what is politically micro and local 
can self-organise and scale in an organic ways nationally and internationally.  The UN 
Global Compact for Business and the impact of transnational civil society on multi-lateral 
institutions are both examples of micro to macro scaling of civic agency, most acutely 
today with responses to environmental concerns.  On a daily basis, changes in household 
behaviour towards domestic waste and its local processing ‘aggregate’ to a significant 
scale in environmental effects but offer no dramatic images that capture media attention.  
The propositions underpinning CDC are not self-limited in terms of the socio-political 
span they can embrace and connect.   
 
(iv) CDC takes as a maxim the requirement for equity of political agency rather than 
equity of economic opportunity that informs dominant sector-based theories of change.  
Inequity in political agency is often captured in the notion of ‘exclusion’ from 
influencing power relationships.  Typically, this results from a lack of capability for 
socio-political engagement stemming, for example, from lack of organisational skills, 
inadequate knowledge of rights or of how decision making should work, or historical-
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cultural barriers to recognition as a political actor.  Overcoming political exclusion may 
call for ‘uncivil’ behaviour.  Naomi Hossain (2009) illustrates that ’rude’ claiming 
making on bureaucrats by poor women from socially excluded groups can make good 
against gender-based inequities in agency. 
 
(v) CDC looks beyond political structures and mechanisms, such as voting, to the 
historical processes and fundamentals of power accumulation and reproduction in a 
country and internationally.  Politics in much of, for example, Central America and 
Africa cannot be understood outside of the social fracturing caused by colonial 
penetration on whatever socio-political arrangements were already in place (e.g., Herbst, 
2001).  What becomes political and why in whose favour over time is the exposed tip of 
an iceberg containing the deeper political forces that establish regime (il)legitimacy to be 
recognised but not to be interpreted on exogenous terms.   
 
(vi) CDC is sensitive to contention between endogenous and exogenous values, measures 
and processes.  It distinguishes between aided and unaided change in society, which 
heightens attention to the role and power of outsiders in influencing socio-political and 
other processes, including how risks are distributed.  The continual struggle for ‘authentic 
partnership’ is a well documented case of structural power asymmetry between aid 
actors.  It is tied to money and assumed primacy of western ‘enlightenment’ norms and 
predispositions towards tangible forms and products over relationships and intangible 
processes.  This ‘values’ factor in aided change plays out strongly, for example, in 
prescription of institutional forms that simply will not work as outsiders intend.  From 
comprehensive, comparative study of governance, Mick Moore and Sue Unsworth 
(2010:77) reach a supporting conclusion that: 
“ … donors need to turn the picture upside down, and develop new drawing 
skills. Unless they do so, they will not make the necessary investment in 
understanding local political dynamics, or make fundamental changes in their 
own organisation, values, attitudes and behaviour. In short, they will find it very 
difficult to resist the temptation to revert to the default position of viewing the 
world through an OECD lens.” 
 
(vii) CDC recognises multiple knowledges that inform agency.  It places trust in people’s 
own sites of knowledge-making which does not necessarily make them right, but is the 
well-spring for learning and self-capacitation.  Farming systems in developing countries 
have long been sites where endogenous agricultural knowledge has gained a place 
alongside that of scientists to steer research investment.  In South Africa’s Eastern Cape, 
on-the-street knowledge about local conditions is being captured and disseminated by a 
civic unit of a Newspaper’s journalists who set up shop in cafes and taxi ranks to directly 
hear what is bugging people on public issues. This daily monitoring of what people see 
municipalities are doing rather than saying is increasing bottom-up pressure to improve 
public services.13  
 
(viii) CDC recognises multiple types and locations of authority and governance and 
reactions to them.  Authority over and accountability to a polity is located in different 
                                                 
13  http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/15/52619.html, accessed 2nd May 2011 
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places for different things.  For example, in signing up for Codes of Conduct and 
accountability charters, NGOs choose to cede some sovereignty in exchange for the 
collective value of complying with negotiated standards.  In the European Union, 
elevation of political authority to a multi-country parliament while pursuing subsidiarity 
creates multiple new sites of governance that citizens interface with, but may not trust or 
understand.  The World Trade Organisation can pass binding ‘top-down’ judgments on 
the legal provisions of member states.  The Kwanda project in South Africa illustrates 
how increases in a community’s capabilities for self-organisation can, from the bottom 
up, impact on many levels of public authority and policy.  Examples include:  changes to 
national approaches to community policing; changes in municipal conditions for liquor 
licensing; local enforcement of bar owners making food available with closing times that 
reduced incidents of rape.14  Poly centricity of governance is an increasing phenomenon 
that must be factored into viewing socio-political processes and the institutions involved 
(McGinnis, 2005). 
 
For any given context and socio-political process, each of these elements has its own 
scales, time lines, metrics and relative weights that are not static or immutable.  Crudely 
framed, driven by inspirations to change domains of life within society, the CDC 
narrative is often about the politics of people moving From Clients to Citizens (Mathie 
and Cunningham, 2008). 
 
Domains 
CDC relies on the concept of socio-political domain centred on an imagined future of a 
‘solved’ wicked problem.  The idea of a domain has a strong affinity with Bourdieu’s 
(1977) concept of ‘social field’.  These are understood as social arenas governed by 
distinctive values and approaches which emphasise their contested nature and the role of 
power in resolving contests, which are inherent to complex problems and social 
dilemmas.15  The significance of social fields is their detachment from any particular 
actor because they also exist as internalised mental elements or frames of reference or 
norms and cultural rules that co-inhabit a person’s psycho-social construct, their habitus.  
In practical terms, a domain can be viewed as a substantive theme or desired future 
condition which holds society’s attention and attracts civic agency from any quarter.  
Examples are corruption as a non-sector specific uncivil behaviour; as is discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation; or social enterprise heralded in new forms of ‘low 
profit limited liability company (an L3);16 or mega-philanthropy as a composite of public 
and private, market and on-market principles with political effects in terms for example, 
of displacing state responsibility for the provision of public goods (Edwards, 2009).  
Informed by the imagined future of interest, domains supersede and selectively combine 
sectors.  It can incorporate a polity’s transnationalism, now being accelerated by 
expanding internet access as well as net-enabled cell phone technology fostering social 
networks and user-driven media (Kanter and Fine, 2010).  Figure 1. Illustrates the 
centrality of civic agency in the CDC narrative.   
                                                 
14  www.seriti.org.za  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOnb4HRJTp0 
15  Social fields, are also found in complexity theory as forces operating and amenable to transmission over 
a societal distance.  Jung’s notion of collective consciousness of a society acts in such a way. 
16 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L3C 
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Figure 1.  CDC:  Illustrative framework 
 
Operating within families and often mediated through groups – for example, with 
religious or cultural ties - civic agency is motivated human energy with sources and 
drivers.  A core task of a CDC lens is to assist in homing in on the origins, expressions 
and combining of civic energy with a sorting and filtering through socio-political 
processes and power to shape collective action and institutional responses to wicked 
problems, understood as selected domains of change.17  Simply put, to deepen and 
sharpen insights in why and how polity, politics and the political work as a society’s 
drivers.  This challenge is described by the Development Leadership Programme in the 
following way: 
“… if one is taking politics seriously, agency matters. By ‘agency’ is meant the 
choices, decisions and actions of individuals, groups and organizations and, in 
particular, their leaders and ’elites’.  They have the potential to change things. 
Just as structures (institutions, rules, cultural norms) have ‘causal power’ (that is, 
they have power to influence what we do), so too do agents, though their causal 
power is different …” (DLP 2010:5, emphasis in original). 
 
CIVIC DRIVEN CHANGE: THEORETICAL LOCATION 
                                                 
17  We are grateful to Mike Edwards for this observation. 
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Civic driven change can be visualised in association with three ‘families’ of theory, some 
more closely related than others.  One grouping is composed of theories associated with 
human and civic agency.  Another concerns micro-politics allied to collective action.  A 
third set unpacks power. The composite nature of CDC brings these theories together in a 
coherent way bounded by the national state as a political project premised on the 
legitimizing existence of citizens.18 
 
Civic agency 
In a comprehensive treatment of the topic, Emirbayer and Mische (1998:963) argue that, 
in sociology, human agency has not been adequately addressed as an analytic category in 
its own right.  In their view, agency is an interplay between: (1) past routine, experience 
and learning, energised by (2) images of a desired future situation, which is then (3) 
situationally-judged for achievability and risk, from which action may or may not be 
taken.  Recent political upheavals in North Africa show how people’s risk calculus can 
change quickly and radically.  In this reflexive sense, inaction is also an action.  Results 
of (in)action feed into capabilities and future decision processes leading to a constantly 
self-developing and updated condition of capability, appraisal and decision choice.  At a 
given moment, any one of the three elements determining agency dominate, but all are 
present in agentic processes.  For these authors, agency is thus defined as:   
“…the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments 
– the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through the interplay of habit, 
imagination, and judgment both reproduces and transforms those structures in 
interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations”. (Emirbayer 
and Mishe 1998:970) 
 
Thus, agency is one category in a total repertoire of human behaviour.  It is co-defined by 
orientation of personal or group action towards the stabilizing, enabling and constraining 
forces of social norms and values embedded in institutions (Walker and Ostrom, 2007).  
Agency can thus be interpreted as an investment in a future that people care about.  CDC 
relates directly to the energising property of agency towards a future that can be 
‘imagined’.  This reflects is an appreciative position on social problem solving. 
 
However, agency itself is subject to human pre-dispositions towards others, themselves 
moderated by theories of the person.  In terms of the former, an ontology of CDC in 
terms of ‘civicness’ is described in the essay by Evelina Dagnino (Fowler and Biekart, 
2008:28).   
“… a critical task would be “to interrogate the ontological essence of civicness in relation 
to contending political projects, their actors and the material base from which they 
emerge and subsist.  This assumes that there is an ontological essence of civicness.  One 
challenge here is to think about what ideas could deserve this position without incurring 
in the reductive risks pointed out above.  One possibility is to resort to ideas that share a 
conception of a basis for life in society.  They run from Hannah Arendt’s common world, 
to Marshall’s “participation in the social heritage”; “a sort of basic human equality”; “the 
claim for recognition as full members of society”.  They may include Patrick Pharo’s notion 
                                                 
18  The problematic nature of citizenship as a concept and category that CDC relies on is substantially 
covered by the recent work of Institute of Development Studies and is not repeated.   
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of an “ordinary civility”, a set of rules (formalized or not, written or not) that make social 
relations and life in society possible: rules for co-existence, built-in in the intersubjective 
dimensions of social life, that only exist to the extent in which they are mutually 
recognized.  What seems to be common in these views is a sort of a first basic preliminary 
layer of meaning in the civic: a disposition to live together in society, which sounds 
reasonable, largely shared and thus difficult to dismiss.”19  
 
She goes on to caution against any homogenous view on what this means (ibid:29): 
“Nevertheless, while equality establishes a connection between civicness, social justice, 
citizenship and democracy, it introduces grounds for differentiation and divergence.20  
Thus, different understandings of these ideas, associated to different political projects, 
imply different directions to civic agency.  It should be clear that this connection is one 
possibility among many others (such as religion, for instance).  But all these different links 
- historically and contextually produced - shape the meanings of civic and civic agency: its 
contents, its subjects, its concrete forms, its locations. Recognizing this diversity, and the 
dispute that pervades it, is a crucial preliminary task.” 
 
In CDC, the inter-subjectivity she speaks of in social relations is interpreted in terms of a 
‘culturalist’ paradigm of the person.  This is counterpoised to a dominant paradigm of the 
person: 
“… which infuses public policy, politics, institutional practice, and much of civic and 
democratic theory and civic action is largely derived from positivist social science and 
science, conceiving the human person in relatively static fashion as an aggregation of 
consumer needs, wants, and appetites. ….“The contending culturalist framework 
conceives of the person in narrative terms, as immensely complex, dynamic, generative 
and “emergent,” full of differing and often contested impulses and interests. It is attentive 
to civic capacity building, cultivation of skills, habits, orientations, and environments 
which enhance people’s abilities for co-creation, or the ability to address common 
differences and to shape their circumstances across lines of bitter difference.”21 
 
Of particular concern in CDC’s approach to agency is what it means to be ‘civic’.  
Adopting a geo-historical reading locates the notion of ‘civic’ as a status-bound 
normative behaviour tied to the rights and responsibilities of those governing city states.  
In Heater’s account (2004) the earliest references to ‘civic’ are allied to the concept of 
citizenship associated with a socio-political status accorded within Spartan communities 
and the governance of Athens.  The corresponding tasks, authority and accountability of 
citizenship were accorded to selected individuals – propertied elites exhibiting valour, 
virtue and commanding influence.  Women, slaves, labourers and craftsmen were 
excluded from this rank.  Exclusion was the norm and remains so in many authoritarian-
ruled societies.  Citizens were recognised as political beings with rights to wield the 
power required to protect and ‘justly’ oversee and govern the affairs of rural communities 
                                                 
19 This underlies an increasingly recurrent category in Brazil and other countries: the distinction between a 
civil and a non-civil society, referring, for instance, to drugs trafficking and criminal organized groups for 
whom the physical elimination of others is seen as a current element of social life. 
20  Differentiation and divergence may also be present in the definition of equality itself. 
21  Clarificatory contribution of Harry Boyte to a review of a CDC research proposal, 10, May 2010, 
mimeo. 
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and of urban city-states.  There was stringent attention to citizens properly discharging 
their mutual duties which called for particular ‘civil’ behaviour in terms of constrained 
self-interest for the overall good.  That which emerged as ‘civic’ – a normative property 
of citizenship - included responsibility for the proper servicing and management of public 
areas and of investments and resources derived from the functioning of the whole 
populace.   
 
With an intervening history of western universalism, Hauguaard (1997:200) is at pains to 
remind us that ‘civic’ as conceived in CDC - concern for the whole and respect for 
difference - is not to be confused by or conflated with ‘civilisation’.  He cautions against 
comparing ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ societies because of the impossibility of 
appreciating the constraints under which they operate over time.  In similar vein, a CDC 
lens must be cautious about applying normative features more widely than the minimum 
envisaged from the combination of ontology and histiography described so far.  For 
CDC, this poses dilemmas of contextualisation, cultural relativity and positioning in 
terms of endogenous and exogenous values alluded to earlier.   
 
From a socio-psychological angle, being civic implies a state of self-awareness or 
mindfulness about humanity and its place in nature.  This condition may involve 
spirituality, theology, rationality and other frames of reference in a habitus of schemata 
and dispositions which co-inform attitudes towards others and towards power (Mwaura, 
2008).  In this vein, public debates about CDC note the importance of the ‘self’ in what 
civic agency means.  For example, taking to heart the idea of being a global citizen with 
corresponding responsibilities:  
“… this could encompass a global citizenship outlook, which can be translated into civic 
actions such as ethical consumerism (consume less, buy fair trade, biological, seasonal 
and local produce), ethical producer-ism (corporate social responsibility and social 
business approaches), active citizenship (vote, be involved and engaged), ethical 
employee-ism (relate, take up responsibility).” (Berkhout, et al, 2011:14) 
 
While this quotation is global in perspective, it actually involves civic agency confronted 
by many places where power within and over socio-political change plays out and need to 
be mediated and governed in one way or another.  CDC as conceived is sensitive to this 
dimension of societal change. 
 
Micro-politics, collective action and the public-private divide 
“It follows from this that thinking politically - and especially about the role of agency - 
requires us to focus on and understand the micro-politics of the phenomenon with which 
we are concerned. Understanding the structural and institutional contexts, and what is 
loosely called the ‘political economy’ is important, of course. But for working politically, 
there is simply no alternative to understanding, in detail, who the players are, what they 
do, where they come from, their organizational affiliations, networks, ideologies 
networks, ideologies and interests and the political dynamics of the issue or sector. 
Detailed political ethnography is needed.” (DLP, 2011:5) 
 
This quotation reflects the significance of delving into the fine-grained nature of socio-
political process, particularly the interface between civic agency and political society.  As 
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argued earlier, civic-driven change can be analysed at various socio-political levels, from 
local to global.  However, it is the local level where civic agency generally manifests 
itself most clearly and is, apparently, least complex.  It is this level where individuals, as 
citizens, consumers, clients, or co-producers take initiatives with public aims which 
shapes civic action.  Goldfarb (2006), describes such processes as the ‘politics of small 
things’, that is routine, mundane practices led by ground-level social actors.  When 
combined, aligned and energised, micro-politics can act as a fundamental political force 
which redefines the situation against prevailing interpretations championed by the 
powerful.  The tenacity of protestors from all walks of life to recast and politically 
redefine Tunisia and Egypt is a potent example. 
“Informed by social movement theory about actors, agency and how change happens, we 
ended up asking the wrong questions as to why the people have risen. In Egypt, Tunisia, 
and Yemen, was there an organised social movement? Certainly not: Did they have visible 
leadership? No. Did they have a massive, or at least significant following? Not in the 
conventional sense of a mobilised constituency.  
 
Our analytical perspectives failed to enable us to ‘see like citizens' and understand that 
people were overcoming barriers of fear and reaching breaking point.” (Tadros, 2011) 
 
Micro initiatives can be of a very different nature, from engaging in a debate on climate 
change around the kitchen-table, to putting a smart phone-filmed video of a Teheran 
oppositional demonstration on You tube, to actually taking risk as a civic actor on the 
streets.  Benford and Snow (2000) have argued how ‘collective action frames’ are 
generated when initial initiatives come together and merge towards becoming movements 
with shared understandings of what needs to be changed.  These are serious negotiations, 
often without mediation of formal groups or political parties.  It is this breeding ground of 
informally negotiated, collective civic action where a CDC orientation is shaped, which 
therefore needs concrete underpinning. 
 
In a CDC narrative, theories of collective action are important.  A particularly critical 
theoretical angle - signalled in Chapter 10 of the CDC book (Fowler and Biekart, 
2008:177) - is a potential guiding philosophy of co-responsibility for the world as a 
global commons.  Here the work of Eleanor Ostrom (2005) on the complexity of public 
action theory, and the contrary historical lessons for collective versus private ownership 
(Harvey, 2011) are likely to be pertinent to approaching wicked problems that often 
appear as social dilemmas: 
 
“The term “social dilemma” refers to a setting in which individuals choose actions in an 
interdependent situation.  If each individual in such situations selects strategies based on 
a calculus that maximizes short-term benefits to self, individuals will take actions that 
generate lower joint outcomes than could have been achieved.”  (Ostrom, 2005:4) 
 
Olson’s proposition that individuals will act collectively to provide private goods, but not 
if it concerns public goods, was elaborated by zooming in on the community level, where 
these differences are less articulated (Boyte, 2008).  The private role of citizens often 
seems to be linked to economic roles when it also can be broadened to include social and 
political ‘responsibility’.  This in itself is an important debate about the line between 
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‘civic-driven’ and ‘profit-driven’, which relates to interfaces between civil society and 
markets.  Such a discussion is also linked to the problematic use of the notion ‘of ‘social 
capital’ in relation to empowerment (Harriss, 2002) which can shed light on the subtle 
shift in interpretation of ‘private’ and ‘public’ to focus on the real meanings of what 
‘civic’ and ‘civic agency’ can imply for political change.  This would include discussions 
about personal ‘risk’, strategies in the form of ‘political projects’ and public service-
delivery aimed at ‘co-production’ at the local level in order to stimulate citizens’ capacity 
to engage. 
 
Power and empowerment 
Political discourse is about power.  The IDS programme researching citizenship provides 
an accessible categorization and analytic entry point (Gaventa, 2007:2). 
“Power ‘within’ often refers to gaining the sense of self-identity, confidence and 
awareness that is a pre-condition for action. Power ‘with’ refers to the synergy which can 
emerge through partnerships and collaboration with others, or through processes of 
collective action and alliance building. Power ‘over’ refers to the ability of the powerful to 
affect the actions and thought of the powerless. The power ‘to’ is important for the 
exercise of civic agency and to realise the potential of rights, citizenship or voice.” 
 
From a CDC point of view, this formulation is helpful but incomplete.  Applying a power 
lens to socio-political processes needs to include theory that interrogates power as both 
individually socialised and embedded and actively constructed by interaction.  This type 
of analysis spans from covert or hidden power to its more overt, institutionalised and 
transactional dimensions.  For example, Bourdieu exposes power deeply hidden with 
acculturated world views and resulting predispositions towards and interpretations of 
identity and life’s experiences (Navarro, 2007).  The work of Lukes (2005) and others 
point to additional, progressively overt, expressions of power.  One is the function of 
language to define the parameters of thought and nature of knowledge.  Language also 
dictates public and private discussion, communications and messages, typically favouring 
existing systems of dominance.  A further influence of language is to label ‘reality’ in 
ways that manipulate or mislead peoples’ predispositions or cause them to misrecognise 
their ‘objective’ interests (Lukes, 2005:149).  Further, Haugaard (1997) demonstrates 
how structuration of power co-determines processes of (political) inclusion and exclusion 
and the rules of the game in socio-political arrangements and engagement.  Finally, many 
authors treat physical coercion and force as, often, the most visible manifestation of 
power upon which – in the Weberian sense – states enjoy a defining monopoly.  To fully 
interrogate social arrangements with their political processes, a CDC lens should draw on 
comprehensive theories and articulations of power as process and as empirical, practical 
expression. 
 
By way of illustration, Table 1 combines both ways of appreciating the qualities of power 
as an individual, collective and transactional phenomenon that can be empirically 
investigated, often in terms of civic agency capabilities and outcomes (Fowler, 2009).  
The table signals a bias towards power as an interactive property that is collectively 
generated applied in collective action found in a closer cluster of theories to CDC and 
problem solving.  It is a first consideration of what a CDC power lens would focus in any 
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chosen domain that will undoubtedly require refinement through research on practical 
application. 
 
Table 1.  Power from a Civic Agency Perspective 
Power 
Expressions/ 
Power Processes 
 
Power Within 
 
Power With 
 
Power To 
 
Power Over 
Socio-
psychological 
forming 
Empowering 
acculturation and 
socialisation 
Associating for public 
action 
Selecting and living a 
self-determined 
identity 
Assertion in society as a 
personal and joint 
political project 
Controlling 
Language 
Applying critical 
interpretations 
Creating a shared 
vocabulary 
Imposing or 
challenging 
discourses 
Diversifying and 
gaining access to 
information 
Controlling Rules Knowing and 
asserting rights and 
interests 
Negotiating collective 
outcomes 
Imposing or 
challenging exclusion 
(Co-)determining 
conventions, laws and 
policies 
Applying coercion Questioning 
expectations of self-
compliance 
Adopting protective 
collaboration 
Opposing 
unaccountable 
authority 
Just use of public 
instruments of physical 
force 
 
Allied to power categories are theories of empowerment which link CDC to a family of 
ideas associated with an ‘activist’ reading of socio-political change.  Drawing on the 
renewed interest for empowerment by liberation theology and feminism in the 1970s, 
CDC has been inspired by the work of Friedmann (1992) who has criticised the neo-
liberal use of empowerment.  He theorised poverty as the lack of access to social power, 
and pointed out that constraints were put on collective self-empowerment by tendencies 
to personalise empowerment strategies and reduce the attention for tackling structural 
conditions causing poverty.  Despite this weakened use of ‘empowerment’, the concept 
remains very relevant for CDC especially when the meaning of power is further 
unpacked in ways described above.  
 
The central idea is to counter the disempowering effect of ‘internalised powerlessness’, 
which had been flagged by Fanon (1986), Foucault (1987), and Freire’s (1974) ‘critical 
consciousness’ , as well as several feminist authors (Rowlands, 1995; Mies & Bennholdt-
Thomsen,1999).  They point at the danger of stripping power from its transformative 
quality.  Indeed, (civic) agency is a tool for targeting disempowering structures.  In this 
vein, a CDC narrative combines toward a theory of empowerment beyond ‘participation’ 
to a developmental democracy emerging though active engagement of the polity which 
reinforces both citizenship and the state as an accountable and effective bearer of 
legitimate authority. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This article responds to an enduring observation that, as a discipline, development studies 
is incomplete in the sense that politics as process and the political as substance have 
remained marginal.  Recent analysis of development research continues to argue the case 
for bringing politics back in.  We do so through a critical conclusion that twenty years of 
civil society discourse has not realised its potential to make the political central.  While 
still of use for examining societal change, a civil society for understanding development 
needs to be ‘re-located’ and refined to sharpen and deepen the political contours and 
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dynamics involved.  Civic driven change is a way of doing so.  The core of the CDC lens, 
also identified by others, is located in the notion of civic agency as an empirical category.   
 
Civic driven change is a work in progress.  To date are three years of public exposure 
through publications, presentations and dedicated events with encouraging and critical 
results.22  This paper is a further step in testing the potential significance of a CDC 
narrative in current debates on how to better comprehend and act towards an era of 
greater political uncertainty, which is allied to a global inability to redress complex issues 
facing societies everywhere.  Critical appraisal by others is invited and will be needed to 
home in on strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Irrespective of what this invitation produces, experience to date signals areas where 
attention is required.  A central challenge is to further explore the ontology relied on as a 
source of imagination-driven civic energy where complex human drivers of reproduction, 
identity and meaning are likely to be in play (Fowler, 2007).  Another issue is to 
‘reconcile’ the normative premises of civic agency with endogenous norms and values.  
The supposedly ontological roots of pro-social behaviour remain open to contextual 
interpretation that has to be dealt with conceptually and methodologically.  A second 
challenge is how to make CDC-illuminated processes visible in terms of knowledge and 
inspiration.  This requirement is particularly tricky when interventions, aided or 
otherwise, are not in play.  In effect it requires exposing and communicating about 
underlying forces that inhabit daily practices and relations that drive the socio-political 
factors in domains of concern.  In turn, this calls for practical ways to understand and 
delineate what a domain involves.  Attention is also called for in terms of the moral 
dilemmas of applying uncivil means – such as public disobedience and confrontations 
with authority and between social groups – to achieve civic outcomes.  Finally, an issue 
remains about what, if anything, CDC can contribute to the generally unsatisfactory state 
of effectiveness with international aid.  If aid as currently envisaged and applied is too 
seldom able to support endogenous civic agency without undermining it, can a CDC 
perspective assist in revising development practice towards a better and more honest 
appreciation of power and the limited role of outsiders? 
                                                 
22  <www.civicdrivenchange.org> 
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